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1  Introduction 
Empirical estimates of the effect of competition policy on productivity are subject to a 
problem: the decision to enforce antitrust regulations is endogenous and may be determined 
by productivity, other competition-enhancing policy decisions such as trade policy, and other 
economic, political and institutional factors. 
  As highlighted by the literature that has studied endogenous policies (Duso and 
Röller, 2003), we are interested in two separate effects. The first one, the selection effect, relates 
to the impact of productivity on the decision to enforce antitrust. To what extend are more 
productive countries more prone to enforce antitrust? The second effect, the competition effect, 
relates to the impact of antitrust on productivity: in how much antitrust boost productivity. 
Cross-country empirical studies have focused on this second effect of antitrust on GDP per 
capita growth (Hayri and Dutz 1999), while ignoring the first one. Treating the decision to 
enforce antitrust as exogenous, ignores the selection effect. As a result, the competition 
effect is biased. 
  Recent cross-country or cross-state empirical studies focused on a set of polices that 
still does not includes antitrust have been able to identify the selection bias and the 
competition effect on economic performance: these include the selection of social policies 
and regulations (Besley and Case 2000), monetary and fiscal policies (Persson and Tabellini 
2003), regulatory reform (Ai and Sappington 2002), and deregulation policies (Duso and 
Röller 2003 and Duso 2003). 
  From a theoretical perspective, Aghion and Schankerman (2004) provide a political 
economy model of the underlying mechanisms at work in the case of policies that intensify 
product market competition (such as the creation of single markets, currency unions or 
investing in physical infrastructure). They also show how an endogenous demand or such 
policies can arise. There has been scarce literature that analyzes specifically antitrust as an 
endogenous policy. Only Symeonidis (2003) using within country data has been able to 
identify the selection and the competition effects on wages and productivity in the special 
quasi-experimental setting of the early cartel policy in the UK. 
  The contribution of this paper is to show that it is important to consider antitrust as 
an endogenous policy. The inference of the impact of antitrust on productivity using cross-
country data might be underestimated or overestimated depending on the nature of the 
underlying simultaneity bias. 
 
2  The effect of antitrust when policy is not selected randomly 
Let the performance outcome, productivity, be denoted by q. Let competition-enhancing 
policies decisions in a set of domains including antitrust be denoted by vector S. Openness 
to international trade qualifies as other competition-enhancing policy domain very closely 
related to that of antitrust.
1 The objective is to identify the true underlying effect of policies 
that promote product market competition (S) on productivity (q). 
                                                 
1 Openness to international trade is a close substitute to antitrust. Both are competition-enhancing 
policies in Aghion and Schankerman (2004) terms, both reduce ‘transport cost’ in a circular model of 
competition. In a seminal paper, Eastman and Stykolt (1960) highlighted the importance of foreign Preliminary version. Do not cite without authors’ permission. Comments welcome 
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  We let cross-country variations in productivity (q) be determined mostly by policies 
(S) and also by geographic and historical determinants:
2 
 
q=f(geography, history, S)  + ε        ( 1 )  
 
  Let policy decisions (S) be simultaneously determined by the productivity outcome 
(q) as in Röller and Duso (2003) in order to assess empirically the impact of the selection 
effect. Competition-enhancing policies decisions in the antitrust and other domains (S) are 
determined as in Hall and Jones (1999) by observable historical and geographic features, and 
additionally, by observable institutional country characteristics as in Persson and Tabellini 
(2003). Additionally, we allow policies to be determined by how big is the country and by 
institutional features such as how pervasive corruption is. 
 
S =g(geography, history, institutions, size, corruption, q)  + υ     ( 2 )  
 
  With respect to size and antitrust, Gal (2003) shows that optimal competition policy 
is very much dependent on the size of an economy. In small economies, competition must 
be equipped to deal effectively with the concentrated nature of most markets because 
markets cannot support the same number of firms as large economies. 
  With respect to corruption and antitrust, Aghion and Schankerman (2004) show that 
economies can fall in a low-competition enforcement trap when political institutions do not 
effectively discipline the behavior of politicians and losers from antitrust successfully bribe 
them. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) show also theoretically that most of regulations, and by 
analogy antirust regulations, are only optimal policies to be in place in countries that can 
eventually enforce that regulations. This is only the case in countries that enjoy low levels of 
corruption and relatively strong institutions. 
  The main objective is to disentangle the impact of S on q, the competition effect, 
from the impact of q on S, the selection effect. The problem is that estimating equations (1) 
and (2) by OLS may be subject to simultaneity bias because S is endogenous. Countries 
select competition-enhancing policies in a non-randomly way. Competition and selection 
effects can be consistently estimated by considering (1) and (2) jointly. The above set-up 
provides for a set of instruments; that is, the institutional factors that determine policies in 
equation (2) and that are uncorrelated with productivity. 
                                                                                                                                                 
competition to avoid collusion among domestic firms in industries where the number of firms 
permitted by economies of scale is more than one but small enough to allow effective collusion. So, 
governments might be less prone to open the economy when internal markets are already highly 
competitive. And, with openness playing channeling foreign competitive pressures, governments 
might be less active in enforcing antitrust. 
2 We will let the data talk on whether geographic and historical determinants affect productivity 
directly or just indirectly through policies as in Hall and Jones (1999), and in Persson and Tabellini 
(2003). Preliminary version. Do not cite without authors’ permission. Comments welcome 
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3  Cross country evidence 
In this paper we use the Persson and Tabellini (2003) dataset which includes cross-section 
observations for 85 countries that qualify as free or semi-free. Country performance is 
measured by total factor productivity in logs (log A) computed by Hall and Jones (1999). 
Openness is measured by the index compiled by Sachs and Werner (1995) and reported by 
Hall and Jones (1999). It shows the fraction of years that the economy of each country has 
been open between 1950 and 1994. 
  We follow Persson and Tabellini (2003) using the following variables as determinants 
of growth policies: latitude (lat01) as defined in Hall and Jones (1999) and regional dummies 
(OECD, Latin-America, Eastern and Southern Asia, Africa); geographic location and 
physical endowments are captured by the (log) predicted trade share of a country’s economy 
based on a gravity model of international trade computed by Frankel and Romer (1996) and 
reported by Hall and Jones (1999); history is captured by variables such as the fractions of 
the population speaking English as their mother tongue (engfrac) or speaking one of the five 
primary European languages (including English) as their mother tongue (eurfrac) as reported 
in Hall and Jones (1999); institutions are measured by a dummy of federalism (federal) and a 
set of colonial-origin variables weight by the amount of time since independence (col_uka, 
col_espa, col_otha). 
  Apart from these variables, we additionally use corruption and country size as 
exogenous determinants of policies: corruption (cpi9500) as compiled by Transparency 
International and the Internet Center for Corruption Research, and the (log) of population. 
Both variables are reported in Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
  The effectiveness of antitrust enforcement is a variable computed by the World 
Economic Forum (published in the World Economic Report). It reports the average answer 
to business persons of 75 countries in 2000 to the following question: anti-monopoly policy 
in your country (1=is lax and not effective at promoting competition, 7=effectively 
promotes competition). The process of matching this data with Persson and Tabellini’s 
(2003) leaves our dataset with 52 country observations. 
  We estimate simultaneously equations (1) and (2) taking into account only two 
competition-enhancing policies: antitrust enforcement and openness to international trade. 
We allow each policy to enter also equation (2) as simultaneous determinant of the other. So, 
we end up with three equations and three variables simultaneously determined (log A, 
antitrust and openness). 
  Results on the impact of openness and antitrust on total factor productivity (log A) 
are reported in the table. Let us first focus on single-equation estimates of equation (1), the 
productivity equation. This is the case of estimating the equation as if competition-
enhancing policies were exogenously chosen. This is as if antitrust enforcement and 
openness to international trade were adopted by countries in a random way, and that the 
selection effects were zero. 
  Apart from these two competition variables, the productivity equation includes only 
the fraction of European language as exogenous variable. This covariate was the only one 
that failed to pass the F-test for excluding exogenous controls that appear to have only an 
indirect effect on productivity through policies. It is important to control for all possible Preliminary version. Do not cite without authors’ permission. Comments welcome 
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determinants of productivity and policies in a cross-country regression, but it makes sense to 
stick to parsimonious specifications led by the data.    
  The impact of antitrust enforcement on total factor productivity is positive and 
statistically significant, implying that competition policy effectiveness raises productivity. The 
estimates suggest that increasing the average antitrust effectiveness in one standard deviation 
would increase average total factor productivity by 28%. The problem with this estimate is 
that we do not know in how much relates to the competition effect, and how much to the 
selection effect.  
  The table also reports the simultaneous estimations of the performance equation (1) 
and the policy equations (2). As in the productivity equation, the policy equations include the 
direct effect of covariates that failed to pass the F-test for excluding controls. OLS 
overestimates the effect of antitrust on total factor productivity by 18%, and underestimates 
the impact of openness on total factor productivity by 37%.
3 
  The table shows the magnitude of the policy substitution effects. It appears that the 
cross-impacts are asymmetric. Having effective antitrust has a larger impact on openness, 
than openness on making antitrust more effective. Increasing antitrust effectiveness in one 
standard deviation reduces openness in approximately one standard deviation. However, 
increasing openness by one standard deviation reduces antitrust effectiveness by only a third 
of a standard deviation approximately. 
  We could not say ex-ante what the direction of the bias in this three equation system 
would be. The overall selection bias of each policy depends on how much the positive direct 
impact of productivity on each policy is neutralized by the negative indirect impact coming 
from the cross-policy effect, that is, from the fact that productivity increases the other policy 
and therefore reduces the policy under study. It appears that the positive direct impact of 
productivity on antitrust is larger than the negative indirect impact of productivity on 
openness that ends up affecting antitrust.
4 
  The robustness of these results depends on the choice of instruments. The 
instruments must be valid (i.e. not correlated with productivity) and strong (i.e. highly 
correlated with the competition variables). With respect to validity, the over-identifying 
restrictions in each simultaneous equation are not rejected.
5 With respect to the power of the 
instruments, the excluded instruments were able to explain a percentage of the variation of 
                                                 
3 Increasing the average antitrust effectiveness in one standard deviation (going from antitrust 
enforcement levels of Portugal or Poland to those of Sweden, New Zealand or Canada) would 
increase average total factor productivity by 23% (from its 4,479 mean level in 1985 US Dollars to 
5,509). Increasing the average openness in one standard deviation (going from the openness of Peru, 
Malta or South Korea to that of the Netherlands, Ecuador or Canada) would increase average total 
factor productivity by 32% (from its 4,479 mean level in 1985 US Dollars to 5,912). 
4 By contrast, in the case of openness, the positive direct impact of productivity on openness is 
smaller than the negative indirect effect of productivity on antitrust that ends up affecting openness. 
In this case, the selection bias is negative: on average more productive countries are less open. 
5 This is not a proof of validity of the instruments, but at least we are safe to say that our instrument 
choices are not violating the restrictions that more than two instruments are orthogonal with the 
error term in each equation. Preliminary version. Do not cite without authors’ permission. Comments welcome 
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the endogenous variables that ranges from 19% to 88%. Moreover, the excluded instruments 
passed the F-test for qualifying as strong instruments (Bound et al. 1995). 
 
4  Conclusion 
Due to the simultaneity among productivity and competition-enhancing policies such as 
antitrust enforcement and openness, we would overestimate the competition effect of 
antitrust. Treating the decision to enforce competition-enhancing policies as exogenous 
attributes to antitrust a larger effect that the true one. Not taking care of policy endogenous 
selection leads to an overestimation bias of 18%. 
  Additionally, making policy selection endogenous needs to take into account that 
there are strong cross effects between different policy domains: antitrust and openness are 
asymmetric substitute policies. Countries with effective antitrust do open their economies 
strongly less, while open countries do have moderately less effective antitrust. 
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Total Factor Productivity, Antitrust and Openness 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Single equation, OLS  Simultaneous equations, 3SLS 
  LOG A  LOG A  ANTITRUST  OPENNESS 















(0.34)***   
Fraction of European language speakers  0.38 
(0.11)*** 
0.28 
(0.10)***   
Latin American country        -0.25 
(0.10)** 
English colonial origin        -0.07 
(0.11) 
Spanish colonial origin        0.02 
(0.25) 
Other European colonial origin      0.51 
(0.21)**   
log Population      0.23 
(0.05)***   




R2  0.58 0.55  0.82 0.34 
Partial R2 excluded instruments: 
Log A 
Antitrust effectiveness 



























Over-identification Hansen J test 






Endogenous variables in columns (2), (3) and (4) are in capital letters: LOG A, ANTITRUST and OPENNESS. 
Instruments identifying the system when excluded from the simultaneous equations: latitude, fraction of English 
speakers, fraction of other European language speakers, trade endowment, federal, English colonial origin, 
Spanish colonial origin, other European colonial origin, Latin American country, East Asia country, African 
country, corruption, (log) population. 
Observations = 52. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. 
 